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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The appeal of Martin Geevers, who pleaded guilty to one 
count of bank fraud arising out of a check kiting scheme, 
requires us to determine once again when application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines may result in the imposition of a 
sentence on the basis of intended loss when the actual loss 
was significantly less. Geevers argues that because a passer 
of worthless checks could not possibly abscond with the 
full face amount of his worthless deposits, the District 
Court erred in calculating his intended loss under a"worst 
case" scenario. Though Geevers's argument possesses 
strong intuitive appeal, we will uphold the District Court's 
full face amount finding. 
 
We base our conclusion on three separate considerations. 
First, we note that there is a distinction between intending 
a loss and expecting a loss. While we agree that Geevers 
may not have reasonably expected to extract the full face 
value of his fraudulent checks from the banks, it does not 
necessarily follow that he did not intend to extract every 
cent possible. Second, the commentary to S 2F1.1 makes 
clear that losses "need not be determined with precision." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 Application Note 9. A district court is 
therefore not barred from considering the full amount of the 
fraudulent checks to be the intended loss although that 
figure may overstate the actual intended figure. Finally, our 
precedent allows some limited burden shifting in the 
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proving of intended loss under the guidelines. We have 
previously recognized that though the government bears the 
burden of proof in guidelines cases, the burden of 
production may shift to the defendant once the government 
presents prima facie evidence of a given loss figure. See 
United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Under this regime, intended loss does not equal the face 
value of the deposited checks as a matter of law. Rather, a 
defendant is free to proffer evidence about his or her true 
intentions in order to rebut the presumption that his or her 
fraudulent deposits may create. A district court does not, 
however, commit error when, in the absence of sufficient 
evidence to the contrary, it fixes the guidelines range based 
upon a presumption that the defendant intended to defraud 
the banks of the full face amount of the worthless checks. 
 
Geevers also contends that if the District Court correctly 
calculated the intended loss figure from his check passing 
activities, he still should have received a three-level 
reduction in his guidelines calculation because he had not 
completed his attempt. This argument raises questions 
about the interpretation of U.S.S.G. S 2X1.1 and its relation 
to the guideline on intended loss, but we reject Geevers's 
contention. The guideline clearly precludes granting a 
downward departure in situations in which the attempted 
conduct was prevented solely through the intervention of 
the victim or law enforcement. Because such is the case 
here, we conclude that Geevers is ineligible for the 
downward departure. 
 
I. 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Geevers pleaded guilty to 
a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344 (bank fraud) for opening a 
bank account at Bankers Savings bank in Woodbridge, New 
Jersey, with a $75,000 check drawn on a closed account at 
Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch advised Bankers Savings that 
the check was not covered by sufficient funds, and Bankers 
Savings closed Geevers's account before he attempted to 
draw any funds on the account. Though this transaction 
produced no loss to the involved banks, it was just one of 
many attempts by Geevers to profit by fraudulently inflating 
bank balances. Between 1996 and 1997, according to the 
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Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"), Geevers repeatedly 
opened accounts in various banks by depositing checks 
from closed accounts or accounts with insufficient funds 
and then attempted to withdraw or transfer a portion of the 
deposited funds before the victim banks realized that the 
funds were not backed. 
 
All told, including both offense conduct and relevant 
conduct recounted in the PSI, Geevers deposited or sought 
to cash checks with face values approximating $2,000,000 
in total. Prior to his apprehension, he attempted to 
withdraw or transfer about $400,000. He actually managed 
to withdraw or transfer over $160,000. The PSI also 
included as relevant conduct the losses arising from a 
fraudulent real estate scheme he perpetrated several years 
earlier. 
 
The parties agreed that the sentence would be calculated 
under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, which is the guideline covering 
offenses of fraud or deceit.1 For purposes of calculating the 
sentence, the government argued that the loss amount 
relevant for sentencing should be the total face value of 
Geevers's deposited checks, which is the potential loss. 
Geevers maintained that he did not intend to cause the full 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Guideline, in relevant part, provides: 
 
       Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or 
Counterfeit 
       Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United 
       States 
 
       (a) Base Offense Level: 6 
 
       (b) Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
        (1) If the loss exceeded $2,000, increase the offense level as 
       follows: 
 
       Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level        
 
       . . . . 
 
       (L) More than $800,000         add 11         
 
       (M) More than $1,500,000       add 12         
 
       (N) More than $2,500,000       add 13         
 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. 
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amount of the potential loss because he could not have 
successfully withdrawn those funds even if he had wanted 
to. In the alternative, he maintained that because he did 
not complete the acts necessary to effect that loss, he was 
at least entitled to a three-level reduction of his offense 
score under S 2X1.1, the guideline pertaining to attempts. 
 
The District Court disagreed and adopted a lossfigure of 
$2,188,575 and rejected the downward adjustment under 
S 2X1.1. Geevers's base offense level under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 
of 6 was therefore increased by 12 levels for a loss in excess 
of $1.5 million and also by 2 levels for more than minimum 
planning. It was then reduced 3 levels for acceptance of 
responsibility under S 3E1.1. The resulting offense level of 
17 carried an imprisonment range between 30 and 37 
months, and the District Court imposed a sentence in the 
middle of the range--33 months. 
 
We have jurisdiction to review Geevers's claim that the 
District Court incorrectly applied the sentencing guidelines 
under 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2). See United States v. Shoupe, 
988 F.2d 440, 444 (3d Cir. 1993). Our review of the District 
Court's interpretation and application of the guidelines is 
plenary, but where the District Court's application is based 
on factual conclusions, we will reverse only if its conclusion 
is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 
821, 823 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
II. 
 
We first consider the question whether the District Court 
erred in considering the face amount of Geevers's 
fraudulent checks in determining the intended loss of his 
scheme under S 2F1.1.2 The section establishes a base 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Both parties refer to Geevers as having engaged in the crime of check 
kiting, which could, under certain circumstances not present here, affect 
our analysis of the amount of Geevers's intended loss. Check kiting is 
traditionally defined as the 
 
       [p]ractice of writing a check against a bank account where funds 
are 
       insufficient to cover it and hoping that before it is deposited the 
       necessary funds will have been deposited. Transfer of funds between 
       two or more banks to obtain unauthorized credit from a bank 
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offense level of 6 for crimes involving fraud or deceit, and 
sets forth a range of possible increases tied to the amount 
of loss that the crime involved. The commentary to the 
guidelines, which is binding, see Stinson v. United States, 
508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993), explains that a sentencing court is 
to consider intended loss in determining the lossfigure. 
"Consistent with the provisions of S 2X1.1 (Attempt, 
Solicitation, or Conspiracy), if an intended loss that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       during the time it takes the checks to clear. In effect, a kite is 
a bad 
       check used temporarily to obtain credit. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 238 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). Check 
kiting has also been defined as "a scheme `designed to separate the bank 
from its money by tricking it into inflating bank balances and honoring 
checks drawn against accounts with insufficient funds,' " United States 
v. Frydenlund, 990 F.2d 822, 824 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States 
v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1992)), which more accurately 
reflects what Geevers has done in the present case. 
 
Geevers does not raise, and we therefore do not address, the issue 
whether the cumulative intended loss of the checks with insufficient 
funds should be reduced because parts of the fraudulent transactions 
were "closed" in nature. A closed loop is the sort that is normally found 
in a check kiting case. There, a worthless check of, say, $1,000 is 
deposited in Bank A, and then a check drawn from Bank A is used to 
open a $1,000 account in Bank B, and a check from that bank is then 
presented for cash to Bank A. This process may be repeated several 
times in order to sustain the kite. In such a circumstance, however, the 
intended loss could still be said to be only $1,000. See United States v. 
Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192, 1196 n.5 (6th Cir. 1993). Most of Geevers's 
transactions do not fall within the traditional check kite format, as his 
deposits and withdrawals were not part of a closed loop, in which the 
same amount of money is sent to each bank in the chain and the chain 
ultimately closes on itself. Though some of Geevers's false checks were 
used to cover accounts from which he attempted fraudulent withdrawals, 
his transactions involved varying amounts of money at numerous 
different banks. The parties do not dispute the manner in which the 
District Court aggregated these transactions, as they suffice, in 
combination with the other relevant conduct, to reach the guideline 
figure arrived at by the District Court regardless of whether Geevers's 
efforts are taken at face value or as failed attempts to create closed 
loops 
as occurs in a typical check kite. The only issue with which we must 
contend, therefore, is whether the amounts charged against Geevers may 
be considered as part of his intended loss. 
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defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, this 
figure will be used if it is greater than the actual loss." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 Application Note 8. Note 9 explains that 
"the loss need not be determined with precision. The court 
need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the 
available information." 
 
At his sentencing hearing, Geevers contended that the 
face amount of the deposited checks cannot be thefigure 
employed in sentencing because no reasonable check kiter 
would think that he or she could get away with 
withdrawing the full face amount of the checks. Pointing to 
the difficulty of calculating a more precise figure of 
intended loss, the District Court rejected Geevers's 
argument. 
 
       I think I grasp your argument, but I find it difficult to 
       ascertain how a Court would be able to determine what 
       the intended loss was in a check kiting scheme, except 
       to take the defendant at his actions, which is to count 
       the full amount of any fraudulent checks from the time 
       that the fraudulent check is deposited. I mean, there's 
       no rule of thumb that the Court can come up with and 
       say well, your typical check kiter is only going to net 5 
       percent or 15 percent of what he's deposited by way of 
       phoney checks. And really that's what you're asking 
       the Court to try to figure out. 
 
App. 58. 
 
Geevers renews this argument on appeal. His argument 
can be broken into two related contentions: 1. The 
government has not proved that he intended to take the 
face value of the false checks; and 2. He could not have 
possibly taken that much, and the intended amount should 
therefore not reflect an impossible amount. We will consider 
these contentions in turn, but first we pause to address the 
import of United States v. Torres, 209 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 
2000), filed after oral argument in this case. 
 
A. 
 
In Torres, the defendant, posing as another individual, 
opened a money market account at a bank with the deposit 
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of a worthless third-party check in the value of $240.65. On 
the same day, another party to the conspiracy, using the 
same false name, deposited a stolen U.S. Treasury check in 
the amount of $66,021.94 in the same account. The 
defendant was arrested after attempting to withdraw 
$24,900 from the account and was convicted of one count 
of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. See id. at 
310. The district court calculated his attempted loss as 
being $66,262.59, that is, the combination of the two 
deposits, despite the defendant's contention that the proper 
amount was the $24,900 he actually attempted to 
withdraw. We affirmed, ruling that "[i]t was eminently 
reasonable for the District Court to infer that Torres 
intended to withdraw the balance of the deposits before the 
stolen check surfaced as stolen and would have done so 
had he not been arrested." Id. at 312. 
 
Though it affirmed the entire calculation of the loss 
amount, the Torres panel did not address whether there 
was any difference between the intent behind depositing a 
worthless check, the issue before us, and depositing a 
stolen one. For purposes of that appeal, any distinction 
would have been irrelevant to the holding, as it was the 
value of the stolen check (in excess of $66,000) that placed 
the defendant into the challenged sentence range, while the 
worthless check (worth only $240.65) was not of sufficient 
value to affect the guidelines. Indeed, the latter issue was 
not briefed in the case.3 Moreover, though the text of the 
opinion refers to the deposited check as "rubber," the facts 
as recited in the opinion do not clarify whether the check 
deposited was a pure fabrication or an attempt to draw 
down the account of a third party. Additionally, the Torres 
panel was not presented with the issue of how to address 
an elaborate false check scheme with the complexity of 
Geevers's. 
 
Torres would thus not appear to be dispositive. At all 
events, the extent of the precedential impact of Torres is 
ultimately unimportant as we reach the same conclusion as 
did that panel. Because there are differences between a 
stolen and a kited check, we find it helpful to analyze and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The present opinion writer was a member of the Torres panel. 
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explain why the District Court's conclusions were 
appropriate under this Court's precedent. 
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
Aside from implications from Torres, our precedent offers 
no clear direction on how to address a defendant in 
Geevers's position.4 Nor do the guidelines or the 
accompanying commentary specifically address this  
situation.5 Our sister circuits are also divided on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The government contends that we have already endorsed its position 
in United States v. Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1994), but this is an 
overstatement of that case. In Shaffer we held that in calculating the 
actual loss from a check kite, the sentencing court must consider the 
loss as it existed at the time of discovery, notwithstanding any future 
restitution attempts. See id. at 114-15. In this regard, we distinguished 
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991), which, as we discuss 
below, allowed such consideration for purposes of a fraudulently 
obtained secured loan. See Shaffer, 35 F.3d at 114. Shaffer does not, 
however, offer any guidance for the calculation of intended loss. Indeed, 
though there were actual losses to the banks in Shaffer, the sentencing 
court ruled that the intended loss to the banks was actually zero 
because the defendant eventually planned to cover all of the checks, 
which were employed in an effort to save an imperiled business. See id. 
at 113. This conclusion would favor Geevers. Because we resolved 
Shaffer on other grounds, we did not reach the question whether the 
court's finding was clearly erroneous as alleged by the government in 
that case. See id. at 113 n.4. At all events, Shaffer does not compel the 
government's favored conclusion that intended loss should be equated 
with the face value of Geevers's fraudulent checks. 
 
5. The government also attempts to rely on commentary to the guidelines 
to uphold the District Court, but we conclude that the proffered 
examples are little help. The government claims that Application Note 8 
of S 2F1.1 expressly provides that the face amount of fraudulent checks 
is a proper measure of intended loss. That note gives the example of 
treatment for a forged, not a kited or worthless, check. "[I]f the fraud 
consisted of . . . representing that a forged check for $40,000 was 
genuine, the loss would be $40,000." Though the District Court viewed 
the example as analogous, it appears inapposite to Geevers's fraud. 
Depositing a forged check and depositing a worthless check are different 
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matter. Compare, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 
1192 (6th Cir. 1993) (remanding for findings whether 
defendant intended to withdraw or could have withdrawn 
face value of deposited checks), with United States v. 
Strozier, 981 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding equation 
of face value of checks with intended loss). 
 
Though our pre-Torres precedent is unclear, it does offer 
some helpful guideposts. It is clear that a district court errs 
when it simply equates potential loss with intended loss 
without deeper analysis. In United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 
521 (3d Cir. 1991), we considered the applicability of 
S 2F1.1 to fraudulent misrepresentations to obtain a bank 
loan, holding that loss should not be equated with potential 
loss at the time of the crime. See id. at 536. In reaching 
this conclusion, we stated that "[t]he fraud guideline thus 
has never endorsed sentencing based on the worst-case 
scenario potential loss . . ." Id.  at 529 (emphasis in the 
original). Moreover, we declared that equating "possible 
loss" with "probable or intended loss" was a "linguistic 
stretch," which we rejected. Id. at 533. Because Kopp dealt 
with an equation of the amount obtained with actual or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
crimes. Depositing a worthless check is a prelude to an attempt to draw 
upon it during the interim period before the bank discovers that the 
check is not backed by sufficient funds. In contrast, when one deposits 
a forged check, the hope is that the bank will honor the check for the 
full value and actually transfer funds from an existing account. Once 
stolen in this manner, the money could be expected to remain in the 
defendant's account; there is no similar interim period during which the 
bank could be expected to stop payment or close the account. 
 
The government and District Court also referred to the example under 
the theft guideline S 2B1.1 n.2 of theft of a check or money order that 
treat the intended loss amount as equivalent to the face value of the 
check. This example and the cases, see, e.g., United States v. 
Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1990), that equate intended loss with 
the face value of stolen checks do not resolve the issue in the 
government's favor for the same reasons that the forgery example fails. 
Though it is true that this Court has declared that a check kite is more 
akin to theft than to a fraudulent attempt to obtain a secured loan, see 
United States v. Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1994), that is not 
equivalent to announcing a rule for the calculation of intended loss, as 
our refusal in Shaffer to reach the issue of intended loss indicates. 
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intended loss, we made no explicit holding on the meaning 
of intended loss, but the quoted passages suggest that 
potential loss should not be equated with the intended loss. 
 
In United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir. 
1999), we applied Kopp to explain that "[i]ntended loss 
refers to the defendant's subjective expectation, not to the 
risk of loss to which he may have exposed his victims." 
Yeaman makes clear, therefore, that the government's 
burden is to prove intended, not possible, loss if it seeks to 
increase the guideline levels faced by the defendant under 
S 2F1.1. 
 
Though Kopp and Yeaman appear to aid Geevers's cause, 
the argument that intended loss is not per se equivalent to 
potential loss only takes him so far. While intended loss 
may not be automatically determinable based on what the 
potential loss is, intended loss may still equal potential 
loss. The District Court must determine Geevers's 
subjective intention, and it can draw inferences from the 
nature of the crime that he sought to perpetrate. 
 
2. 
 
We therefore must resolve the question whether a 
reasonable inference may be drawn that a defendant in 
Geevers's position intends to cause the full loss of the face 
value of his false checks. We hold that such an inference 
may be made. Concomitantly, we conclude that the matter 
is not to be determined as a question of law, but as one of 
fact. 
 
It seems likely that a defendant in Geevers's position 
does not expect to obtain the full amount of his fraudulent 
checks. Common sense suggests that a check kite will 
always be incomplete, and that a kiter will either abscond 
or be discovered before exhausting the kite. But expectation 
is not synonymous with intent when a criminal does not 
know what he may expect to obtain, but intends to take 
what he can. We believe that a sentencing court may 
plausibly conclude that a defendant like Geevers would 
likely have taken the full amount of the deposited checks if 
that were possible. Indeed, in one of Geevers's transactions, 
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as the government points out, Geevers was actually able to 
cause a loss worth 85 percent of the amount he deposited. 
 
To assume that Geevers did not want it all is to assume 
that had one of the banks somehow failed to detect his 
fraud and started sending Geevers monthly balance 
reports, Geevers would have refrained from taking any more 
of the money. Given Geevers's conduct, the District Court 
could reject this proposition as unlikely. Though he may 
not have expected to get it all, he could be presumed to 
have wanted to.6 As the District Court explained, "the 
actual loss sustained by the victim becomes a matter only 
of how quickly and how effectively the victim shuts the 
barn door before the rest of the horses have gotten out." 
App. 88. We conclude that it is not an error of law for a 
court to draw inferences from the face value of the checks 
in arriving at the factual conclusion that the defendant 
intended to let all the horses out if possible. If the 
preceding is correct, then Geevers is free to come forward 
with evidence to demonstrate that he actually intended 
something less, but the government has made its prima 
facie case. 
 
Our ruling is consistent with our prior precedent that has 
addressed the government's burden of proof when proving 
subjective intent. In United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 
253 (3d Cir. 1998), we stated that though the defendant 
does not have to "prove the negative" vis-a-vis his absence 
of intent, "the burden of production shifts to the defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The government made a version of this argument before the District 
Court. "[T]he continuing pattern of Mr. Geevers' conduct indicates . . . 
that had . . . any one of these institutions been asleep at the switch, 
Mr. 
Geevers would have happily continued right along in that particular 
institution defrauding them of dollar after dollar for as long as the 
money 
continued to flow." App. 68. The facts in the PSR support this argument. 
In one of Geevers's transactions recounted by the PSR, but not utilized 
by the District Court as relevant conduct, the involved bank froze 
Geevers's account after learning that his deposits were no good. At this 
point, Geevers had already been given $40,000 worth of checks. Due to 
an error, the bank then released the account and sent Geevers a 
statement stating that he had a $4,000 balance remaining. According 
the PSR, Geevers then wrote two checks for most of the remaining 
balance. 
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once the government has made out a prima facie case." See 
also United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 434-35 (3d Cir. 
1994) (once the government makes a prima facie case in 
sentencing, the party challenging the government's case 
has the burden of coming forward with evidence at a 
sentencing hearing that shows the government's evidence is 
incomplete or incorrect). Of course, the burden of 
persuasion always remains with the government. See 
Evans, 155 F.3d at 253; Raven, 39 F.3d at 435. As 
discussed above, intent need not jibe perfectly with 
expectation when a defendant may not know precisely how 
much he or she will get away with before discovery, so the 
amount on the fraudulently deposited checks may be used 
by a district court in determining whether the government's 
burden has been met in establishing a given intended loss 
figure. 
 
There remains the issue of why the face value of the 
deposited checks may be used to make the prima facie case 
that Geevers intended the full loss when even Geevers's 
most harmful transaction considered for sentencing 
purposes only caused eighty-five percent of the potential 
loss. The answer to this question begins with the 
admonition of Application Note 9 of S 2F1.1, which tells us 
that loss need not be proven precisely. "The court need only 
make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available 
information." Therefore, because the face value of the 
deposited checks is germane to analysis of intent, the 
government's presentation of the face value as evidence 
may make a prima facie case that the defendant intended 
to cause the full loss of those amounts. Applying this figure 
is not unfair to the defendant insofar as it represents a sum 
that was entirely under his control when he elected to act 
in contravention of the law. Once the government presented 
this information to the District Court, therefore, we 
conclude that the Court was free to accept the lossfigure 
in the absence of persuasive evidence from Geevers that his 
intent was to steal a lesser amount. 
 
To be clear, the face value of the deposited checks is not 
to be mechanically assumed to be the intended loss. We 
merely hold that a sentencing court may consider that as 
sufficient evidence that it was the intended loss. A 
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defendant may, of course, produce evidence of his or her 
own in an attempt to convince the court that anotherfigure 
was intended. It is easy to imagine circumstances where 
this may be so. For example, if a man needed $10,000 for 
surgery for his wife and sought to acquire the sum by 
engaging in a check kite, he might make a worthless 
deposit of $50,000 in order to inflate his "balance" to a high 
enough level that the bank would honor a $10,000 check. 
Such a defendant would likely be able to demonstrate that 
his subjective intent was only to take $10,000. 
 
It is certainly possible, therefore, for a defendant to 
convince a sentencing court that he or she did not in fact 
intend any actual loss. Geevers failed to make such 
arguments here, beyond his claim that he could not have 
expected to get it all and a statement by his attorney at 
sentencing that "somewhere in his mind [Geevers] believed 
he was going to catch up." App. 104. He also did not 
present any evidence of what his actual intent was, which 
he could have requested to do under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). 
As a result, the District Court was left with only Geevers's 
assertions of what a "sensible check kiter could . . . have 
reasonably expected." App. 88. Without having been 
provided by the defendant with an alternative reasonable 
basis on which to arrive at a more precise intended loss 
figure, the District Court did not commit clear error in 
making the guidelines calculation that it did.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In his reply brief, Geevers argues that the District Court made a per 
se rule that intended loss is the equivalent of potential loss. We do not 
agree. We think it clear from the transcript of the hearing that the 
District Court did not exclude the possibility that Geevers could have 
intended a lesser loss; rather the Court concluded that Geevers had 
failed to come forward with persuasive arguments that another figure 
should be used. It stated that Geevers simply urged that only the actual 
loss figure should have been used, but as the Court noted, actual loss 
in the factual circumstances at hand is a function of how quickly the 
victim of the fraud acts to stop the perpetrator. We do not view these 
statements as announcing a per se rule. To be sure, the Court could also 
have decided to charge Geevers simply with the withdrawals that he 
attempted to make. However, in light of the likely prospect that Geevers 
would have continued to return to withdraw additional sums at any 
bank that failed to discover his fraud, see supra note 6, we conclude 
that the District Court was not obligated to favor this figure. 
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3. 
 
Allowing district courts to consider the face value of 
checks as probative of intended loss avoids one negative 
consequence of the reading urged by Geevers: the potential 
equation, for culpability purposes, of disparate forms of 
conduct. We think that a defendant who falsifies checks for 
large sums of money is more culpable than one who does 
so for lesser sums. Were we to adopt Geevers's position, 
however, this distinction would be eroded. Adopting his 
argument would equate the culpability of someone who 
falsifies checks for large sums of money with that of one 
who writes false checks for small amounts in situations 
where there is no differential in the amount successfully 
stolen. Given the creation of a risk to financial institutions 
that attends the presentment of such checks, we view such 
a result as a troubling one that should be avoided to the 
extent possible and consistent with the legal framework 
surrounding the guidelines.8 
 
Our approach enjoys the added advantage of consistency 
with the duty of sentencing courts to consider the goals of 
affording adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, see 18 
U.S.C. S 3553, because it provides incremental levels of 
deterrence against criminals who may be considering 
inflating the face values of the worthless checks that they 
plan to deposit. If sentencing courts are allowed to sentence 
based on the value of the falsely deposited check, check 
kiters will learn that the more they write, the more they 
risk, potentially reducing the face value of false deposits. As 
it is generally true that the amount that a kiter is able to 
steal will be a fraction of the amount deposited, deterring 
large fraudulent deposits will serve to reduce the amount of 
money ultimately lost to such frauds. As for the reverse 
danger, overdeterrence, we do not think the potential of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As for the reverse argument, that our approach draws no distinction 
between the defendant who makes a false deposit and attempts to 
withdraw the full amount with one who makes the same deposit, but 
only attempts to take a fraction, a defendant in the latter situation who 
can demonstrate to the sentencing court that his or her intended theft 
was less than the full amount will indeed receive a lighter sentence. If 
he 
or she cannot make such a showing, then there is no difference in 
culpability. 
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over-deterring the deposit of false checks is of particular 
concern. 
 
C. Impossibility 
 
Geevers also argues that he cannot be ascribed with 
intending to take money that would have been impossible 
to take. The question whether it was truly impossible for 
Geevers to abscond with the full face value of his 
fraudulent deposits does not appear to have been litigated 
at any length in the District Court. Assuming arguendo, 
however, that these assertions are correct, we do not view 
them as necessitating a different outcome. Rather, we join 
the majority of courts of appeals in holding that 
impossibility is not in and of itself a limit on the amount of 
intended loss for purposes of calculating sentences under 
the guidelines. The majority rule is that impossibility does 
not require a sentencing court to lower its calculation of 
intended loss. Compare, e.g., United States v. Klisser, 190 
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United States v. 
Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Wai-Keung, 115 F.3d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1997), 
with United States v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192, 1196 
(6th Cir. 1993). 
 
As a matter of guidelines interpretation, we conclude that 
the majority position is correct. Intent is intent. 
Impossibility bears on what is reasonable for the person to 
have intended to do, but the language in Application Note 
8 of S 2F1.1 does not give any indication that 
adventuresome or deluded criminals are to have their 
actions interpreted differently than those of their more 
sober counterparts. Nor does the attempt guideline, 
S 2X1.1, make any provision for consideration of 
impossibility. 
 
Moreover, Application Note 11 of S 2F1.1 specifically 
provides an escape valve for situations in which the 
intended loss may "overstate the seriousness of the 
offense." The note provides an example that specifically 
contemplates a situation of impossibility. "[Overstatement] 
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may occur, for example, where a defendant attempted to 
negotiate an instrument that was so obviously fraudulent 
that no one would seriously consider honoring it." In light 
of the specific contemplation of impossibility in the context 
of departures, grafting an impossibility exception on to the 
setting of the offense level is inconsistent with the language 
and structure of the guidelines. Cf. United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. North Star Steel Co., Inc., 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 
1993) ("[A] statute's provisions should be read to be 
consistent with one another, rather than the contrary.").9 
 
We therefore conclude that the purported impossibility of 
Geevers's absconding with the full amount of his worthless 
deposits did not render erroneous the District Court's 
factual conclusions about Geevers's intended loss. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, Geevers argues that if the District Court was 
correct to consider the face value of his deposited checks in 
calculating his intended loss, he should at least receive the 
benefit of U.S.S.G. S 2X1.1(b)(1), which provides for a three- 
level guideline reduction for attempts. Geevers maintains 
that he qualifies for this reduction because he had not 
drawn the full amount of money that he falsely deposited at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We also note that our interpretation of the guideline's text is 
supported by the need to deal with culpability in a proportional manner. 
"Limiting intended loss to that which was likely or possible . . . would 
eliminate the distinction between a defendant whose only ambition was 
to make some pocket change and one who plotted a million-dollar fraud." 
United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 
In discussing Application Note 11 in a footnote in his reply brief, 
Geevers argues that his trial counsel should have moved for a departure 
on the grounds that the sentencing court's lossfigure overstated the 
seriousness of the offense. He claims that this was ineffective assistance 
of counsel that is established by a sufficient record on appeal so that it 
may be considered on direct appeal rather than on collateral review. See 
United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1996). A reply 
brief is generally too late to raise an issue under our jurisprudence. See 
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 204-05 n. 29 
(3d Cir. 1990). Therefore any such claim will have to be raised under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255. 
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the time of his arrest. The District Court based its denial of 
this argument on both the guideline's applicability and its 
terms: 
 
       For the record, I do not believe that it applies, but 
       assuming for the sake of argument that 2X1.1 applies 
       to any degree, given the factual circumstances here, 
       then I do find as a matter of fact, that the 3-point 
       downward adjustment is not available because it was 
       the intervention of a third party, either apprehension 
       by the bank or law enforcement, that prevented . . . the 
       full flowering of the acts of the offense from occurring. 
 
App. 64. 
 
A. 
 
It is not clear from the record whether Geevers should be 
viewed as having pleaded guilty solely to a completed crime 
or an attempt. Section 2X1.1(b)(1) provides for the 
reduction for an attempt "unless the defendant completed 
all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful 
completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances 
demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all 
such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some 
similar event beyond defendant's control." Application Note 
2 explains that " `[s]ubstantive offense,' as used in this 
guideline, means the offense that the defendant was 
convicted of soliciting, attempting, or conspiring to 
commit." The government contends that Geevers was not 
convicted of an attempt, but rather the substantive crime of 
bank fraud set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 1344, but this does not 
dispose of the issue. The statute incorporates both the 
completed act and the attempt. See 18 U.S.C.S 1344 
("Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a 
scheme or artifice . . . .") (emphasis added). Indeed, the 
District Court did not clearly state whether it thought that 
the offense pleaded to resolved the issue. See  App. 57 ("18 
U.S.C. Section 1344 contains both the completed 
substantive offense and the attempt. So the offense statute 
does not really tell us one way or the other whether we go 
to 2X."). The Court further acknowledged that Geevers's 
crime "theoretically, [ ] could be viewed as a series of 
attempts to some degree." App. 63. 
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Moreover, Application Note 10 of S 2F1.1 directs the 
sentencing court to S 2X1.1. 
 
       In the case of a partially completed offense (e.g., an 
       offense involving a completed fraud that is part of a 
       larger, attempted fraud), the offense level is to be 
       determined in accordance with the provisions of 
       S 2X1.1 . . . whether the conviction level is for the 
       substantive offense, the inchoate offense . . . or both; 
       see Application Note 4 in the Commentary toS 2X.1. 
 
We therefore conclude that S 2X1.1 may apply to Geevers. 
We turn then to consideration of whether a defendant in 
Geevers's shoes fits under the language of the guideline. 
 
B. 
 
Section 2X1.1(b)(1) states that there is no reduction if 
"the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant was 
about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or 
interruption by some similar event beyond defendant's 
control." Geevers argues that with respect to the offense to 
which he pleaded guilty, the depositing of the worthless 
$75,000 check at Bankers Savings, he had never attempted 
to draw funds and had even returned the checks that had 
been issued him. This argument for applying S 2X1.1(b)(1) 
fails based on the facts as represented by Geevers. By 
Geevers's own admission, Bankers Savings closed his 
account after Merrill Lynch, which had hosted the closed 
account on which Geevers attempted to draw, notified 
Bankers Savings that the check was not backed by 
sufficient funds. This intervention by a third party 
prevented Geevers from even attempting to draw on his 
worthless check. 
 
There was no legal error in the District Court's 
consideration of this fact, nor clear error in the factual 
finding that followed: that Geevers would have completed 
his intended fraud but for the intervention of a third party. 
See United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 
1992) (applying similar analysis). Even more damaging to 
Geevers's argument is the District Court's explicitfinding 
during the colloquy that Banker's Savings closed Geevers's 
account upon the warning of Merrill Lynch that Geevers's 
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deposit was not backed by adequate funds, thereby placing 
Geevers's conduct squarely within the limiting language of 
S 2X1.1(b) for attempts interrupted by events beyond the 
defendant's control. 
 
Nor does the language of Application Note 4 aid Geevers. 
It provides: 
 
       In certain cases, the participants may have completed 
       (or have been about to complete but for apprehension 
       or interruption) all of the acts necessary for the 
       successful completion of part, but not all, of the 
       intended offense. In such cases, the offense level for 
       the count . . . [is the greater of the offense level for the 
       completed offense minus three or the offense level for 
       the completed part of the offense]. For example, where 
       the intended offense was the theft of $800,000 but the 
       participants completed (or were about to complete) only 
       the acts necessary to steal $30,000, the offense level is 
       the offense level for the theft of $800,000 minus 3 
       levels, or the offense level for the theft of $30,000, 
       whichever is greater. 
 
Because the District Court concluded that Geevers would 
have taken the rest of the money but for the interruption by 
law enforcement and the intervention of the victim banks, 
this commentary is inapplicable. 
 
We acknowledge that an extreme reading of this 
application note could be taken to mean that failure to 
complete the full range of acts necessary to complete the 
fraud automatically demands the reduction, 
notwithstanding the interference of third parties. Such a 
reading would, however, clash directly with both the text of 
the guideline, see S 2X1.1(b)(1), and another part of the 
official commentary. The "background" note to S 2X1.1 
further explains (with emphasis added): 
 
       In most prosecutions for conspiracies or attempts, the 
       substantive offense was substantially completed or was 
       interrupted or prevented on the verge of completion by 
       the intercession of law enforcement authorities or the 
       victim. In such cases, no reduction of the offense level 
       is warranted. Sometimes, however, the arrest occurs 
       well before the defendant or any co-conspirator has 
 
                                20 
  
       completed the acts necessary for the substantive 
       offense. Under such circumstances, a reduction of 3 
       levels is provided . . . . 
 
This note, in conjunction with the guideline's text, makes 
clear that interruption, except in the early planning stages, 
precludes the three-level reduction. On the facts before us, 
it was not clear error for the District Court to have 
concluded that the intervention by the banks was not"well 
before" the completion of the necessary acts for the 
substantive offense.10 See United States v. Torres, 209 F.3d 
308, 312 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Because the intercession of other parties makes clear that Geevers is 
ineligible for a reduction under S 2X1.1, we need not explore the 
alternative grounds of denial that Geevers had completed all of the acts 
necessary for the completion of the offense. 
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